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The Disengagement Was a Missed Opportunity of Historic Proportions
by Giora Eiland
- The disengagement was a missed opportunity of historic proportions. The disengagement contributed nothing to the solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
- Because at the end of 2003 both Israel and the world had reached the conclusion that on the one hand it was important to end the conflict quickly, and on the other hand, in the existing paradigm it is impossible to solve it.
- The maximum that Israel can give is less than the minimum that the Palestinians must accept. I think that was a rare opportunity to offer a new paradigm.
- But the disengagement simply said the occupation was bad, that there is no chance for an agreement so long as there is occupation, and therefore, let us narrow the occupation.
- The same is said by the convergence. There is logic in the thinking, but it does not lead to long-term stability. The move along a unilateral path leads us to the classic solution of two states for two peoples, and I think this is an impossible solution.
- The convergence will not bring stability. It will not solve the conflict. But it will encourage Hamas to keep the calm. There is a convergence of interests between the government of Israel and Hamas. Maj.-Gen. Eiland recently stepped down as head of Israel's National Security Council. (Ha'aretz)
Think Now Before It's Too Late
by Ari Shavit
- Had Sharon remained prime minister, he would not be proceeding toward a convergence plan a la
Ehud Olmert. Even in his final days as prime minister, Sharon viewed a withdrawal to the 1967 borders as a disaster.
- It is because Israel has no organized strategic management method. There's no system. There is no critical examination of fundamental assumptions. There is no systematic definition of goals and
targets.
- And the result? A questionable decision-making process with regard to the definition of the disengagement. A complete lack of decision-making with regard to the declarations on the convergence.
- The conclusion is clear: The basic law of the Israeli-Palestinian jungle is that an Israeli withdrawal does not diminish the conflict, but instead exacerbates it.
- Since any Israeli withdrawal is interpreted by the Palestinians as surrender, it increases their appetite to obtain additional surrenders. The result is not stability, but violence, which under the conditions of the end of the occupation, is liable to become extreme.
- Eiland has commanded us to think. For their sake and for all of our sake, Olmert and Turbowicz must take on that command. The command to think now, to think before it is too late. (Ha'aretz/IMRA)
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A Healthy Reaction
by Yossi Alpher
- Most Israelis do understand that most Palestinians just want a decent life. Most of us would still eagerly embrace a negotiated two-state solution if it seemed fair and respectful of Israel's Jewish character and left us capable of looking after our own security and identity.
- Palestinians regularly gripe about the fence and Israeli unilateralism without evincing the slightest recognition that the bombings, coupled with the perception that they seek to undermine Israel's Jewish character, brought this upon them.
- Even if Olmert somehow thought he could persuade the world to recognize his "realignment" border fence as final and official, he now acknowledges that it will be little more than the starting point for future negotiations.
- Olmert's plan does indeed keep alive the possibility of negotiating a two-state solution once Palestinians achieve stability under a moderate and effective leadership. Surely this is an improvement on the current situation.
- We Israelis have also made our share of critical mistakes that have undoubtedly contributed to the situation that produced unilateralism.
- We may well have misread and misunderstood some of the motives for Palestinian actions and positions. Yet I would argue that, on the whole, our unilateralist reaction to the events of the past five years is a healthy one. (Bitterlemons)
If Not Realignment, What?
by Alon Pinkas
- Realignment is a demographic, moral and political imperative that would preserve, perhaps save, Israel as a Jewish and democratic state.
- A final status agreement is unachievable since the Palestinians are incapable or unwilling to accept a framework that Israel can live with and the status quo will only lead to the emergence of a "One state, one man, one vote" nightmare.
- The historic conclusion that emanated was that Israel and the Palestinians are not talking about the same conflict. Israel was ready to negotiate 1967 and the Palestinians demanded to redress 1948.
- The two narratives are incompatible; the Hamas victory in the Palestinian elections only exacerbates the problem, which is why it may not be amenable to a negotiated settlement in the traditional way.
- Israel cannot conceivably benefit in the long run from a withdrawal from Gaza and a West Bank status quo pending serious Palestinian interlocutors with which to negotiate a settlement.
- What we are practically left with is a protracted conflict-management situation, in which the first order of business is to disentangle Israelis and Palestinians. It may not lead to peace, but realignment is the only rational option available. The writer served as consul general in New York. (Jerusalem Post)
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