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The Disengagement Has Failed
by Moshe Ya'alon
- The failure was to be expected. It stems from the fact that underlying the disengagement was a baseless idea. It did not derive from a thorough strategic analysis but from political distress and from the personal distress of prime minister Ariel Sharon.
- Accordingly, what we actually had was an internal Israeli game that ignored events outside Israel. What we had was disengagement from reality and disengagement from the truth. The entire process created a false hope that was not based on strategy and was not based on facts.
- The conceptual flaw that underlies the disengagement is the following: the fact that there is no one to talk to on the other side does not mean that we can ignore the other side or the consequences our actions have on it.
- The basic paradigm of the two-state solution is an irrelevant one. In the present situation, it cannot be implemented. Therefore, what Israel has to do is to undermine this paradigm, not entrench it.
- The disengagement was a cardinal strategic error. It led to the victory of Hamas. It provided a tailwind for terrorism. It nourished the Palestinian struggle for years to come. It gave the Iranians and the Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Qaida the feeling that Israel can be defeated. Lt.- Gen.(res.) Moshe Ya'alon served as Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces. (Ha'aretz)
The End of the Third Way
by Ari Shavit
- Initially, there was the First Way - the occupation, nonrecognition of the Palestinians, a belief in the entire Land of Israel.
- Then, the Second Way appeared - peace, recognition of the Palestinians, belief in a full peace. In the 13 years between the outbreak of the first intifada and the outbreak of the second intifada, that of the suicide bombers, the Israeli worldview was one of peace, and nothing else.
- Only afterward, from among the rubble, did the Third Way arise - unilateral withdrawal, separation from the Palestinians, belief in complete separation.
- Today, however, it is no longer possible to ignore the results of the experiment, which are as follows: With regard to Israel, the disengagement succeeded. It proved that there is a solid majority in Israel that wants to end the occupation, and that there is a government that knows how to act effectively in order to do so.
- But with regard to the Palestinians in particular, and to Muslim zealots in general, the disengagement failed. It strengthened the extremists among them, and weakened the moderates; it bolstered the ethos of an armed struggle, and brought Hamas to power.
- The naive belief that there is a quick and simple way to divide the land departed this world in June-July 2006. The simplistic belief in a simplistic withdrawal has gone bankrupt. (Ha'aretz)
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Terrorism Has Nothing to Do with Disengagement
by Dov Weisglass
- In the second half of 2003, it became clear to the prime minister that there was little chance that the Palestinians would implement the road map. Hence, the need for a unilateral move arose.
- In this sense, the disengagement plan anticipated the process of Palestinian disintegration and did not generate it. The disengagement is the Israeli response to the Palestinian chaos, and what is now happening in Gaza is post-factum proof that the unilateral concept was right.
- Terrorism stems from the process of the governmental and societal disintegration, which leads to an increase in internal and external violence; that process has nothing to do with the disengagement.
- People also say we should have done more to help Abu Mazen. That is a captivating slogan. But the devil, as we know, is in the details. Any help to Abu Mazen would have meant a reduction in security.
- I think the unilateral idea is right also for Judea and Samaria. The Gaza Strip and the West Bank are different in a thousand dimensions. The garb the plan has to assume will be different for a thousand reasons, but at bottom the unilateral conception is right. Dov Weisglass served as advisor to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. (Ha'aretz)
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